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Abstract
A multicast game is a network design game modelling how selfish
non-cooperative agents build and maintain one-to-many network com-
munication. There is a special source node and a collection of agents
located at corresponding terminals. Each agent is interested in se-
lecting a route from the special source to its terminal minimizing the
cost. The mutual influence of the agents is determined by a cost shar-
ing mechanism, which evenly splits the cost of an edge among all the
agents using it for routing. In this paper we provide several algorith-
mic and complexity results on finding a Nash equilibrium minimizing
the value of Rosenthal potential. Let n be the number of agents and
G be the communication network. We show that
• For a given strategy profile s and integer k ≥ 1, there is a local
search algorithm which in time nO(k) · |G|O(1) finds a better strat-
egy profile, if there is any, in a k-exchange neighbourhood of s.
In other words, the algorithm decides if Rosenthal potential can
be decreased by changing strategies of at most k agents;
• The running time of our local search algorithm is essentially tight:
unless FPT = W [1], for any function f(k), searching of the k-
neighbourhood cannot be done in time f(k) · |G|O(1).
The key ingredient of our algorithmic result is a subroutine that finds
an equilibrium with minimum potential in 3n · |G|O(1) time. In other
words, finding an equilibrium with minimum potential is fixed-parameter
tractable when parameterized by the number of agents.
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1 Introduction
Modern networks are often designed and used by non-cooperative individuals
with diverse objectives. A considerable part of Algorithmic Game Theory
focuses on optimization in such networks with selfish users [2, 6, 9, 13, 14,
17, 22, 23].
In this paper we study the conceptually simple but mathematically rich
cost-sharing model introduced by Anshelevich et al. [3, 4], see also [16,
Chapter 12]. In a variant of the cost-sharing game, which was called by
Chekuri et al. the multicast game [5], the network is represented by a
weighted directed graph with a distinguished source node r, and a collection
of n agents located at corresponding terminals. Each agent is trying to select
a cheapest route from r to its terminal. The mutual influence of the players
is determined by a cost sharing mechanism identifying how the cost of each
edge in the network is shared among the agents using this edge. When h
agents use an edge e of cost ce, each of them has to pay ce/h. This is a very
natural cost sharing formula which is also the outcome of the Shapley value.
The multicast game belongs to the widely studied class of congestion
games. This class of games was defined by Rosenthal [21], who also proved
that every congestion game has a Nash equilibrium. Rosenthal showed that
for every congestion game it is possible to define a potential function which
decreases if a player improves its selfish cost. Best-response dynamics in
these games always lead to a set of paths that forms a Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, every local minimum of Rosenthal potential corresponds to a
Nash equilibrium and vice versa. However, while we know that the mul-
ticast game always has a Nash equilibrium, the number of iterations in
best-response dynamics achieving an equilibrium can be exponential (see [3,
Theorem 5.1]), and it is an important open question if any Nash equilibrium
can be found in polynomial time. The next step in the study of Rosenthal
potential was done by Anshelevich et al. [3], who showed that Rosenthal po-
tential can be used not only for proving the existence of a Nash equilibrium
but also to estimate the quality of equilibrium. Anshelevich et al. defined
the price of stability, as the ratio of the best Nash equilibrium cost and
the optimum network cost, the social optimum. In particular, the cost of
a Nash equilibrium minimizing Rosenthal potential is within log n-factor of
the social optimum, and thus the global minimum of the potential brings to
a cheap equilibrium. The computational complexity of finding a Nash equi-
librium achieving the bound of log n relative to the social optimum is still
open, while computing the minimum of the Rosenthal potential is NP-hard
[3, 5].
Our results. In this paper we analyze the following local search problem.
Given a strategy profile s, we are interested if a profile with a smaller value
of Rosenthal potential can be found in a k-exchange neighbourhood of s,
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which is the set of all profiles that can be obtained from s by changing
strategies of at most k players. Our motivation to study this problem is
two-fold.
• If we succeed in finding some Nash equilibrium, say by implementing
best-response dynamics, which is still far from the social optimum, it
is an important question if the already found equilibrium can be used
to find a better one efficiently. Local search heuristic in this case is a
natural approach.
• Since the number of iterations in best-response dynamics scenario can
be exponential (see [3, Theorem 5.1]), it can be useful to combine the
best-response dynamics with a heuristic that at some moments tries to
make “larger jumps”, i.e., instead of decreasing Rosenthal potential by
changing strategy of one player, to decrease the potential by changing
in one step strategies of several players.
Let us remark that the number of paths, and thus strategies, every player
can select from, is exponential, so the size of the search space also can be
exponential. Since the size of k-exchange neighbourhood is exponential, it
is not clear a priori, if searching of a smaller value of Rosenthal potential in
a k-exchange neighbourhood of a given strategy profile can be done in poly-
nomial time. We show that for a fixed k, the local search can be performed
in polynomial time. The running time of our algorithm is nO(k) · |G|O(1),
where n is the total number of players1. As a subroutine, our algorithm uses
a fixed-parameter algorithm computing the minimum of Rosenthal potential
in time 3n · |G|O(1). We find this auxiliary algorithm to be interesting in its
own. It is known that for a number of local search algorithms, exploration
of the k-exchange neighbourhood can be done by fixed-parameter tractable
(in k) algorithms [10, 18, 24]. We show that, unfortunately, this is not the
case for the local search of Rosenthal potential minimum. We use tools
from Parameterized Complexity, to show that the running time of our local
search algorithm is essentially tight: unless FPT = W [1], searching of the
k-neighbourhood cannot be done in time f(k) · |G|O(1) for any function f(k).
2 Preliminaries
Multicast game and Rosenthal potential. A network is modeled by
a directed G = (V,E) graph. There is a special root or source node r ∈ V .
There are n multicast users, players, and each player has a specified terminal
node ti (several players can have the same terminals). A strategy s
i for player
i is a path Pi from r to ti in G. We denote by Π the set of players and by S
i
1The number of arithmetic operations used by our algorithms does not depend on the
size of the input weights, i.e. the claimed running times are in the unit-cost model.
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the finite set of strategies of player i, which is the set of all paths from r to
ti. The joint strategy space S = S
1×S2×· · ·×Sn is the Cartesian product
of all the possible strategy profiles. At any given moment, a strategy profile
(or a configuration) of the game s ∈ S is the vector of all the strategies of the
players, s = (s1, . . . , sn). Notice that for a given strategy profile s, several
players can use paths that go through the same edge. For each edge e ∈ E
and a positive integer h, we have a cost ce(h) ∈ R of the edge e for each
player who uses a path containing e, provided that exactly h players share
e. With each player i, we associate the cost function ci mapping a strategy
profile s ∈ S to real numbers, i.e., ci : S → R. For a strategy profile s ∈ S,
let ne(s) be the number of players using the edge e in s. Then the cost the
i-th player has to pay is
ci(s) =
∑
e∈E(Pi)
ce(ne(s)),
and the total cost of s is
c(s) =
n∑
i=1
ci(s).
The potential of a strategy profile s ∈ S, or equivalently, the set of paths
(P1, . . . , Pn), is
Φ(s) =
∑
e∈∪ni=1E(Pi)
ne(s)∑
h=1
ce(h). (1)
In this paper, we are especially interested in the case where the cost of
every edge is split evenly between the players sharing it, i.e, the payment of
player i for edge e is ce(h) =
ce
h
for ce ∈ R. Respectively, Rosenthal potential
of a strategy profile s ∈ S is
Φ(s) =
∑
e∈∪ni=1E(Pi)
ce · H(ne(s)),
where H(h) = 1 + 1/2 + 1/3 + · · · + 1/h is the h-th Harmonic number.
For a strategy profile s ∈ S and i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, we denote by s−i the
strategy profile of the players j 6= i, i.e. s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . sn). We
use (s−i, s¯i) to denote the strategy profile identical to s, except that the ith
player uses strategy s¯i instead of si. Similarly, for a subset of players Π0,
we define s−Π0 , the profile of players j 6∈ Π0. For σ ∈ ×i∈Π0S
i, we denote
by (s−Π0 , σ) the strategy profile obtained from s by changing the strategies
of players in Π0 to σ.
A strategy profile s ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium if no player i ∈ Π can
benefit from unilaterally deviating from his action to another action, i.e.,
∀i ∈ Π and ∀s¯i ∈ Si, ci(s−i, s¯i) ≥ ci(s).
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The crucial property of Rosenthal potential Φ is that each step performed by
a player improving his payoff also decreases Φ. Consequently, if Φ admits a
minimal value in strategy profile, this strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium.
Parameterized complexity. We briefly review the relevant concepts of
parameterized complexity theory that we employ. For deeper background on
the subject see the books by Downey and Fellows [7], Flum and Grohe [12],
and Niedermeier [20].
In the classical framework of P vs NP, there is only one measurement (the
overall input size) that frames the distinction between efficient and inefficient
algorithms, and between tractable and intractable problems. Parameterized
complexity is essentially a two-dimensional sequel, where in addition to the
overall input size n, a secondary measurement k (the parameter) is intro-
duced, with the aim of capturing the contributions to problem complexity
due to such things as typical input structure, sizes of solutions, goodness of
approximation, etc. Here, the parameter is deployed as a measurement of
the amount of current solution modification allowed in a local search step.
The parameter can also represent an aggregrate of such bounds.
The central concept in parameterized complexity theory is the concept
of fixed-parameter tractability (FPT), that is solvability of the parameterized
problem in time f(k) · nO(1). The importance is that such a running time
isolates all the exponential costs to a function of only the parameter.
The main hierarchy of parameterized complexity classes is
FPT ⊆W [1] ⊆W [2] ⊆ · · · ⊆W [P ] ⊆ XP.
The formal definition of classes W [t] is technical, and, in fact, irrelevant
to the scope of this paper. For our purposes it suffices to say that a problem
is in a class if it is FPT-reducible to a complete problem in this class. Given
two parameterized problems Π and Π′, an FPT reduction from Π to Π′ maps
an instance (I, k) of Π to an instance (I ′, k′) of Π′ such that
(1) k′ = h(k) for some computable function h,
(2) (I, k) is a YES-instance of Π if and only if (I ′, k′) is a YES-instance
of Π′, and
(3) the mapping can be computed in FPT time.
Hundreds of natural problems are known to be complete for the afore-
mentioned classes, and W [1] is considered the parameterized analog of NP,
because the k-Step Halting Problem for nondeterministic Turing ma-
chines of unlimited nondeterminism (trivially solvable by brute force in time
O(nk)) is complete for W [1]. Thus, the statement FPT 6=W [1] serves as a
plausible complexity assumption for proving intractability results in param-
eterized complexity. Independent Set, parameterized by solution size, is
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a more combinatorial example of a problem complete for W [1]. We refer
the interested reader to the books by Downey and Fellows [7] or Flum and
Grohe [12] for a more detailed introduction to the hierarchy of parameterized
problems.
Local Search. Local search algorithms are among the most common heuris-
tics used to solve computationally hard optimization problems. The common
method of local search algorithms is to move from solution to solution by
applying local changes. Books [1, 19] provide a nice introduction to the
wide area of local search. Best-response dynamics in congestion games cor-
responds to local search in 1-exchange neighbourhood minimizing Rosenthal
potential Φ; improving moves for players decrease the value of the potential
function. For strategy profiles s1, s2 ∈ S, we define the Hamming distance
D(s1, s2) = |s1 △ s2| between s1 and s2, that is the number of players
implementing different strategies in s1 and s2. We study the following pa-
rameterized version of the local search problem for multicast.
We define arena as a directed graph G with root vertex r, a multiset of
target vertices t1, . . . , tℓ and for every edge e of the graph a cost function
ce : Z
+ → R+ ∪ {0} such that ce(h) ≥ c(h+ 1) for h ≥ 1.
p-Local Search on potential Φ Parameter: k
Input: An arena consisting of graph G, vertices r, (t1, . . . , tℓ) and cost
functions ce, a strategy profile s, and an integer k ≥ 0
Problem: Decide whether there is a strategy profile s′ such that Φ(s′) <
Φ(s) and D(s, s′) ≤ k, where Φ is as defined in (1).
3 Minimizing Rosenthal potential
The aim of this section is to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. The p-Local Search on potential Φ problem is solvable
in time (
|Π|
k
)
· 3k · |G|O(1).
Let us remark that in particular, if Φ is Rosenthal’s potential, and hence
the cost functions are of the special type ce(h) =
ce
h
, the p-Local Search
on potential Φ problems can be solved within the running time of Theo-
rem 3.1.
We need some additional terminology. Let G be a directed graph. We
say that a subdigraph T of G is an out-tree if T is a directed tree with
only one vertex r of in-degree zero (called the root). The vertices of T of
out-degree zero are called leaves. We also say that a strategy profile s∗ is
optimal if it gives the minimum value of the potential, i.e., for any other
6
strategy profile s, Φ(s) ≥ Φ(s∗). Let s = (P1, . . . , P|Π|) be a strategy profile
and C ≥ 1 be an integer. We say that s uses C arcs if the union T of the
paths Pi consists of C arcs.
If edge-sharing is profitable, then we can make the following observation
about the structure of optimal strategies.
Lemma 3.2. Let C be an integer such that there is a strategy profile using
at most C arcs. Let s = (P1, . . . , P|Π|) be a strategy profile using at most C
arcs such that
(i) Among all profiles using at most C arcs, s is optimal. In other words,
for any profile s′ using at most C arcs, we have Φ(s′) ≥ Φ(s).
(ii) Subject to (i), S uses the minimum number of arcs.
Then the union T of the paths Pi, i ∈ {1, . . . , |Π|}, is an out-tree rooted in
r.
Proof. Targeting towards a contradiction, let us assume that T = ∪
|Π|
i=1Pi is
not an out-tree. Then there are paths Pi, Pj , i, j ∈ {1, . . . , |Π|}, that have a
common vertex v 6= r such that the (r, v)-subpaths P vi and P
v
j of Pi and Pj
respectively enter v by different arcs.
We show first that
∑
e∈E(P vi )
ce(ne(s)) >
∑
e∈E(P vj )
ce(ne(s)). (2)
cannot occur. Assume that (2) holds. We claim that then the i-th player
can improve his strategy and, consequently, Φ can be decreased, which will
contradict the optimality of s. Denote by P the (r, ti)-walk obtained from
Pi by replacing path P
v
i by P
v
j . Notice that P is not necessarily a path.
Let P ′ be a (r, ti)-path in P and let us construct the new strategy profile
s′ = (s−i, P ′). This profile uses at most C arcs. By non-negativity of ce(h),
the new cost for the i-th player is equal to
∑
e∈E(P ′)
ce(ne(s
′)) =
∑
e∈E(P ′)∩E(Pi)
ce(ne(s)) +
∑
e∈E(P ′)\E(Pi)
ce(ne(s) + 1) ≤
≤
∑
e∈E(P )∩E(Pi)
ce(ne(s)) +
∑
e∈E(P )\E(Pi)
ce(ne(s) + 1).
Since for each e ∈ E and h ≥ 1, we have ce(h) ≥ ce(h+ 1),
∑
e∈E(P )\E(Pi)
ce(ne(s) + 1) ≤
∑
e∈E(P )\E(Pi)
ce(ne(s)).
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Therefore, ∑
e∈E(P ′)
ce(ne(s
′)) ≤
∑
e∈E(P )
ce(ne(s)).
By (2), we have
∑
e∈E(P )
ce(ne(s)) <
∑
e∈E(Pi)
ce(ne(s)),
and the claim that player i can improve follows.
Hence, ∑
e∈E(P vi )
ce(ne(s)) ≤
∑
e∈E(P vj )
ce(ne(s)).
By the same arguments as above, we can replace Pj by a (r, tj)-path P in the
walk obtained from Pj by the replacement of P
v
j by P
v
i without increasing
Φ. Moreover, we can repeat this operation for each path Ph, h 6= i, that
enters v by an arc that is different from the arc in Pi. The number of arcs
used by the paths in the modified strategy profiles is at most the number of
arcs used in s, and thus is at most C. It remains to observe that we obtain
a strategy profile where v has in-degree one in the union of paths. But it
contradicts the choice of s, since we obtain a strategy profile that uses less
arcs. Hence, T is an out-tree rooted in r.
We use Lemma 3.2 to find an optimal strategy profile using the approach
proposed by Dreyfus and Wagner [8] for the Steiner Tree problem.
Theorem 3.3. Given an arena as input, the minimum value of a potential
Φ can be found in time 3|Π| · |G|O(1). The algorithm can also construct the
corresponding optimal strategy profile s∗ within the same time complexity.
Proof. We give a dynamic programming algorithm. For simplicity, we only
describe how to find the minimum of Φ, but it is straightforward to modify
the algorithm to obtain the corresponding strategy profile.
Let T = {t1, . . . , t|Π|} be the multiset of terminals. We construct partial
solutions for subsets X ⊆ T . Also, while at the end we are interested in the
answer for the source r, our partial solutions are constructed for all vertices
ofG. For a vertex u ∈ V (G) and a multiset X ⊆ T , let ΓXu denote the version
of the game, in which only players associated with X build paths from u to
their respective terminals. Therefore, we are interested in the game ΓTr . For
a non-negative integer m, we define Ψ(u,X,m) as the minimum value of the
potential Φ(s) in the game ΓXu , taken over all strategy profiles s such that
the union of paths in s contains at most m arcs (we say that s uses arc e
if it is contained in some path from s). We assume that Ψ(u,X,m) = +∞
if there are no feasible strategy profiles. Notice that by Lemma 3.2, the
number of arcs used in an optimal strategy in the original problem is at
most |V (G)| − 1. Hence, our aim is to compute Ψ(r, T, |V (G)| − 1).
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Clearly, Ψ(u, ∅,m) = 0 for all u ∈ V and m ≥ 0. For non-empty X and
m = 0, Ψ(u,X,m) = 0 if all terminals in X are equal to u, and Ψ(u,X,m) =
+∞ otherwise. We need the following claim.
Claim 1. For X 6= ∅ and m ≥ 1, Ψ(u,X,m) satisfies the following equation:
Ψ(u,X,m) = min{Ψ(u,X,m− 1),
Ψ(u,X \ Y,m1) + Ψ(v, Y,m2) +
|Y |∑
h=1
c(u,v)(h)},
(3)
where the minimum is taken over all arcs (u, v) ∈ E(G), ∅ 6= Y ⊆ X, and
m1,m2 ≥ 0 such that m1 +m2 = m − 1; it is assumed that Ψ(u,X,m) =
Ψ(u,X,m− 1) if the out-degree of u is zero.
Proof. Let
ψ = min{Ψ(u,X,m − 1),Ψ(u,X \ Y,m1) + Ψ(v, Y,m2) +
|Y |∑
h=1
c(u,v)(h)}.
We prove that Ψ(u,X,m) = ψ by first showing that Ψ(u,X,m) ≥ ψ, and
then that Ψ(u,X,m) ≤ ψ. Without loss of generality assume that X =
{t1, . . . , tℓ} ⊆ T , where ℓ = |X|.
If Ψ(u,X,m) = +∞, then Ψ(u,X,m) ≥ ψ. Suppose that Ψ(u,X,m) 6=
+∞ and consider a strategy s∗ = (P1, . . . , Pℓ) in the game Γ
X
u which is
optimal among those using at mostm arcs and, subject to this condition, the
number of used arcs is minimum; in particular, s∗ has potential Ψ(u,X,m).
By Lemma 3.2, H = ∪ℓi=1Pi is an out-tree rooted in u. If |E(H)| < m,
then Ψ(u,X,m) = Ψ(u,X,m − 1) ≥ ψ. Assume that |E(H)| = m. As
m ≥ 1, vertex u has an out-neighbor v in H. Denote by H1 and H2 the
components of H − (u, v), where H1 is an out-tree rooted in u and H2 is an
out-tree rooted in v. Let Y ⊆ X be the multiset of terminals in H2 and let
m1 = |E(H1)|, m2 = |E(H2)|. Notice that exactly |Y | players are using the
arc (u, v) in s∗ and Y is nonempty. Then Ψ(u,X,m) ≥ Ψ(u,X \ Y,m1) +
Ψ(v, Y,m2) +
∑|Y |
h=1 c(u,v)(h) ≥ ψ.
Now we prove that Ψ(u,X,m) ≤ ψ. If ψ = Ψ(u,X,m − 1) then the
claim is trivial, so let v, Y , m1 and m2 be such that ψ = Ψ(u,X \ Y,m1) +
Ψ(v, Y,m2) +
∑|Y |
h=1 c(u,v)(h). Assume without loss of generality that Y =
{t1, . . . , tℓ′} for some ℓ
′ ≤ ℓ. If Ψ(u,X \Y,m1) = +∞ or Ψ(v, Y,m2) = +∞,
then the inequality is trivial. Suppose that Ψ(u,X \ Y,m1) 6= +∞ and
Ψ(v, Y,m2) 6= +∞. Consider a strategy s
∗
1 in the game Γ
X\Y
u that is optimal
among those using at most m1 arcs, and a strategy s
∗
2 in the game Γ
Y
v that
is optimal among those using at most m2 arcs. Of course, the potential of s
∗
1
is equal to Ψ(u,X \Y,m1), while the potential of s
∗
2 is equal to Ψ(u, Y,m2).
We construct the strategy profile s in the game ΓXu as follows. For each
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terminal tj ∈ X \ Y , the players use the (u, tj)-path from s
∗
1. For any
tj ∈ Y , the players use the (v, tj)-path from s
∗
2 after accessing v from u
via the arc (u, v), unless u already lies on this (v, tj)-path, in which case
they simply use the corresponding subpath of the (v, tj)-path. Note that
s uses at most m1 + m2 + 1 = m arcs. Because for every e ∈ E(G) and
every h ≥ 1, we have that ce(h) ≥ 0, and ce(h) ≥ ce(h + 1), we infer that
Φ(s) ≤ ψ, as possible overlapping of arcs used in s∗1, s
∗
2 and the arc (u, v)
can only decrease the potential of s. Since Ψ(u,X,m) ≤ Φ(s), this implies
that Ψ(u,X,m) ≤ ψ.
In order to finish the proof of Theorem 3.3, we need to observe that
using the recurrence (3) one can compute the value Ψ(r, T, |V (G)| − 1) in
time 3|Π| · |G|O(1).
We use Theorem 3.3 to construct algorithm for p-Local Search on
potential Φ and to conclude with the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Theorem of Theorem 3.1. Consider an instance of p-Local Search on
potential Φ. Let T = {t1, . . . , t|Π|} be the multiset of terminals and let s
be a strategy profile. Recall that p-Local Search on potential Φ asks
whether at most k players can change their strategies in such a way that the
potential decreases. Observe that we can assume that exactly k players are
going to change their strategies because some of these players can choose
their old strategies. There are
(|Π|
k
)
possibilities to choose a set of k players
Π0 ⊆ Π. We consider all possible choices and for each set Π0, we check
whether the players from this set can apply some strategy to decrease Φ.
Denote by X ⊆ T the multiset of terminals of the players from Π0, and
let s′ = s−Π0 . We compute the potential Φ(s′) for this strategy profile. Now
we redefine the cost of edges as follows: for each e ∈ E(G) and h ≥ 1,
c′e(h) = ce(ne(s
′) + h). Clearly, c′e(h) ≥ 0 and c
′
e(h) ≥ c
′
e(h + 1). Let Φ
′
be the potential for these edge costs. We find the minimum value of Φ′(s∗)
for the set of players Π0 and the corresponding terminals X. It remains to
observe that Φ(s′)+Φ′(s∗) = min{Φ(s′′) | s′′ = (s−Π0 , σ), σ ∈
∏
i∈Π0
Si}. By
Theorem 3.3, we can find Φ′(s∗) in time 3k ·|G|O(1) and the claim follows.
4 Intractability of local search for Rosenthal po-
tential
This section is devoted to the proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. p-Local Search on potential Φ, where Φ is Rosenthal
potential for multicasting game, is W[1]-hard.
Before we give the proof, let us remind a classical inequality that will be
useful.
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Definition 4.2. Let a1 ≥ a2 ≥ . . . ≥ an and b1 ≥ b2 ≥ . . . ≥ bn be sequences
of real numbers. We say that sequence (ai) majorizes sequence (bi), denoted
(ai)  (bi), if
∑n
i=1 ai =
∑n
i=1 bi and
∑k
i=1 ai ≥
∑k
i=1 bi for all 1 ≤ k < n.
Theorem 4.3 (Hardy-Littlewood-Polya´ inequality, [15]). Let f be a convex
function on interval [a, b] and a1 ≥ a2 ≥ . . . ≥ an and b1 ≥ b2 ≥ . . . ≥ bn be
sequences of real numbers from [a, b]. If (ai)  (bi), then
n∑
i=1
f(ai) ≥
n∑
i=1
f(bi).
Let us note that by changing the sign of f we obtain that for concave
functions the same result holds, but with inequality reversed.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.1.
Proof. We provide an FPT reduction from the Multicoloured Clique
problem, which is known to be W[1]-hard [11].
Multicoloured Clique Parameter: k
Input: An undirected graph H with vertices partitioned into k sets
V1, V2, . . . , Vk, such that each set Vi is an independent set in H.
Problem: Is there a clique C in G of size k?
Observe that by the assumption that each Vi is an independent set, the
clique C has to contain exactly one vertex from each part Vi.
We take an instance (H, k) of Multicoloured Clique and construct
an instance (G, s, k(k − 1)) of p-Local Search on potential Φ. First,
we provide the construction of the new instance; then, we prove that the
constructed instance is equivalent to the input instance ofMulticoloured
Clique. During the reduction we assume k to be large enough; for constant
k we solve the instance (H, k) in polynomial time by a brute-force search and
output a trivial YES or NO instance of p-Local Search on potential
Φ.
Construction. First create the root vertex r. For every u ∈ Vi, we
create k vertices: u and u1, . . . , ui−1, ui+1, . . . , uk. Denote by Fu the set
{u1, . . . , ui−1, ui+1, . . . , uk}. We connect the created vertices in the follow-
ing manner: we construct one arc (r, u) with cost R = k2, and for all
j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , k} we construct arc (u, uj) with cost 0. With
every vertex uj for all u ∈ V (H) we associate a player that builds a path from
r to uj. In the initial strategy profile s, each of (k− 1)|V (H)| players builds
a path that leads to his vertex via the corresponding vertex u. Observe that
the potential of this strategy profile is equal to |V (H)| ·R · H(k − 1).
We now construct the part of the graph that is responsible for the choice
of the clique. We create a pseudo-root r′ and an arc (r, r′) with cost
W =
1
H(k(k − 1))
(
k ·R · H(k − 1)−
3
2
(
k
2
)
− ε
)
,
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where ε = k−1
k5
. Note that W ≥ 1 for sufficiently large k. For every edge
uv ∈ E(H), where u ∈ Vi and v ∈ Vj , i 6= j, we create a vertex xuv, arc
(r′, xuv) of cost 1, and arcs (xuv, uj), (xuv, vi) of cost 0. This concludes the
construction.
Before we proceed with the formal proof of the theorem, let us give some
intuition behind the construction. Given a clique C in H, we can construct
a common strategy of k(k−1) players assigned to vertices from
⋃
u∈V (C) Fu,
who can agree to jointly rebuild their paths via the pseudo-root r′. The
“cost of entrance” for remodelling the strategy in this manner is paying
for the expensive arc (r, r′); however, this can amortised by sharing cheap
arcs (r′, xuv) for uv ∈ E(C). The costs have been chosen so that only the
maximum possibility of sharing, which corresponds to a clique in H, can
yield a decrease of the potential.
r
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . .
V1 V2 Vk
u
R
r′
W
xuv
1
Figure 1: Graph G
From a clique to a remodelled strategy profile. Assume that C is
a clique in H with k vertices. Let us remind, that in the initial strategy
profile s each player is using the corresponding arc (r, u) for his path. We
construct the new strategy profile s′ by changing strategies of k(k−1) players
as follows. For every uv ∈ E(C), where u ∈ Vi and v ∈ Vj , i 6= j, the players
associated with vertices uj and vi reroute their paths so that in s
′ they lead
via r′ and xuv to respective targets. In comparison to the profile s, the new
profile s′:
• has congestion withdrawn from arcs (r, u) for u ∈ V (C)—this de-
creases the potential by k ·R · H(k − 1);
• has congestion introduced to arcs (r, r′) and (r′, xuv) for uv ∈ E(C)—
this increases the potential by W · H(k(k − 1)) + 32
(
k
2
)
.
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Therefore, Φ(s′) = Φ(s)−k ·R·H(k−1)+W ·H(k(k−1))+ 32
(
k
2
)
= Φ(s)−ε <
Φ(s).
From a remodelled strategy profile to a clique. Let s′ be a strategy
profile such that Φ(s′) < Φ(s) and D(s, s′) = ℓ ≤ k(k− 1). Let L be the set
of players who have rebuilt their strategies in s′; then |L| = ℓ. Let p be a
player in L, who is assigned to a vertex uj ∈ Fu for some u ∈ V (H). Observe,
that the only possibility of rebuilding the strategy for p is to choose a path
leading through r′ and a vertex xuv for some uv ∈ E(H), v ∈ Vj . We now
examine all the arcs of the graph G with nonzero costs in order to provide
a lower bound on ∆Φ = Φ(s′) − Φ(s). We partition the arcs into three
classes: (i) arcs (r, u) for u ∈ V (H), (ii) arc (r, r′), and (iii) arcs (r′, xuv)
for uv ∈ E(H). For each of these classes we analyze the contribution to the
difference ∆Φ; by this we mean the difference of contributions to potentials
Φ(s′) and Φ(s) from the corresponding arcs.
Firstly, consider arcs (r, u) for u ∈ V (H). In total, ℓ players withdraw
their paths from these arcs. The contribution to s′ of these arcs is equal to∑
u∈V (H)R · H(au), where au is the number of players using the arc (r, u)
in strategy profile s′. We know that
∑
u∈V (H) au = (k− 1)|V (H)| − ℓ, while
0 ≤ au ≤ k − 1 for all u ∈ V (H). Observe that then the sequence (au) is
majorized by a sequence consisting of |V (H)|−
⌊
ℓ
k−1
⌋
−1 terms (k−1), one
term (k − 1) − (ℓ mod (k − 1)), and
⌊
ℓ
k−1
⌋
zeroes. Therefore, since H can
be extended to a concave function, by Theorem 4.3 we infer that:
∑
u∈V (H)
H(au) ≥
(
|V (H)| −
⌈
ℓ
k − 1
⌉)
H(k−1)+H((k−1)−(ℓ mod (k−1))).
(4)
Moreover, from concavity of function H we infer that
H((k − 1)− (ℓ mod (k − 1))) ≥
(k − 1)− (ℓ mod (k − 1))
k − 1
H(k − 1). (5)
Using (4) and (5) we infer that
∑
u∈V (H)
H(au) ≥
(
|V (G)| −
ℓ
k − 1
)
H(k − 1). (6)
This implies that the contribution of these arcs to ∆Φ is at least −R · ℓ
k−1 ·
H(k − 1).
Now, consider the arc (r, r′). There are exactly ℓ players using this arc
in s′, while in s nobody was using it. Therefore, the contribution from this
arc to ∆Φ is equal to W · H(ℓ).
Finally, consider arcs (r′, xuv) for uv ∈ E(H). All the ℓ players which
rebuild their strategies in s′ use exactly one such arc. Moreover, each of these
edges can be shared by at most two players. Therefore, the contribution to
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∆Φ from these edges is at least ℓ2 ·H(2) =
3
4ℓ, and the contribution is larger
by at least 12 if any player does not share the arc with some other player.
Concluding, since Φ(s′) < Φ(s) we have that 0 > ∆Φ ≥ 34ℓ+W · H(ℓ)−
R · ℓ
k−1 · H(k − 1). Therefore,
R ·
H(k − 1)
k − 1
>
3
4
+W ·
H(ℓ)
ℓ
. (7)
Note that once we infer that the contribution from any of the three classes
of arcs is actually larger than estimeted in the previous paragraphs, we can
add the corresponding term to the right-hand side of equation (7).
We claim now that ℓ = k(k−1). Let us define g(t) = H(t)
t
. Observe that
for t > 1 we have that
g(t) − g(t− 1) =
H(t)
t
−
H(t− 1)
t− 1
= H(t− 1)
(
1
t
−
1
t− 1
)
+
1
t2
=
1
t2
−
H(t− 1)
t(t− 1)
≤
1
t2
−
1
t(t− 1)
≤ −
1
t3
.
Hence, function g is decreasing and H(ℓ)
ℓ
≥ H(k(k−1))
k(k−1) .
Assume that ℓ < k(k−1); then it follows that H(ℓ)
ℓ
≥ H(k(k−1))
k(k−1) +
1
k6
. We
obtain that
R ·
H(k − 1)
k − 1
>
3
4
+W ·
H(k(k − 1))
k(k − 1)
+W ·
1
k6
=
3
4
+
1
k(k − 1)
(
k · R · H(k − 1)−
3
2
(
k
2
)
− ε
)
+W ·
1
k6
=
3
4
+R ·
H(k − 1)
k − 1
−
3
4
−
ε
k(k − 1)
+W ·
1
k6
= R ·
H(k − 1)
k − 1
+
W − 1
k6
≥ R ·
H(k − 1)
k − 1
.
The last inequality follows from W ≥ 1, which is true for k large enough.
This contradiction shows that ℓ = k(k − 1).
Every arc of the form (r′, xuv) can be used by at most two players. Now
we want to prove that no arc (r′, xuv) can be used by exactly one player
in the strategy profile s′. For the sake of contradiction, we assume that at
least one of the arcs (r′, xuv) is used by exactly one player in s
′. Then the
total contribution to ∆Φ of the arcs of the form (r′, xuv) is at least
3
4ℓ+
1
2 .
Similarly as before, we obtain that
R ·
H(k − 1)
k − 1
>
3
4
+
1
2k(k − 1)
+W ·
H(k(k − 1))
k(k − 1)
= R ·
H(k − 1)
k − 1
+
1
2k(k − 1)
−
ε
k(k − 1)
= R ·
H(k − 1)
k − 1
+
(
1
2
− ε
)
·
1
k(k − 1)
≥ R ·
H(k − 1)
k − 1
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This contradiction shows that in the strategy profile s′, all the arcs of the
form (r′, xuv) are used by zero or by two players.
Finally, we want to prove that the sequence (au) contains exactly |V (H)|−
k terms k−1 and k zeroes, i.e. the set of players that did rebuild their strate-
gies is “concentrated” on k vertices of H. Suppose that this is not the case.
Then the sequence (au) is majorized by a sequence containing |V (G)|−k−1
terms k − 1, one term k− 2, one term 1 and k− 1 zeroes. By Theorem 4.3,
the contribution of arcs of the form (r, u) to ∆Φ is at least
R · ((|V (H)| − k − 1) · H(k − 1) +H(k − 2) +H(1)) −R · |V (H)| · H(k − 1)
= R · (|V (H)| − k) · H(k − 1) +R ·
(
1−
1
k − 1
)
−R · |V (H)| · H(k − 1)
= −R · k · H(k − 1) +R ·
(
1−
1
k − 1
)
.
Similarly as before, we obtain that
R ·
H(k − 1)
k − 1
>
3
4
+W ·
H(k(k − 1))
k(k − 1)
+
1
k(k − 1)
· R ·
(
1−
1
k − 1
)
= R ·
H(k − 1)
k − 1
+
R
k(k − 1)
·
(
1−
1
k − 1
)
−
ε
k(k − 1)
≥ R ·
H(k − 1)
k − 1
.
This contradiction shows that we can distinguish k vertices u1, u2, . . . , uk
such that L is exactly the set of players assigned to vertices
⋃k
i=1 Fui . We
claim that H[{u1, u2, . . . , uk}] is a clique.
Consider the vertex u1. Without loss of generality we assume that u1 ∈
V1. In strategy profile s
′, the player associated with vertex u1j has to share
an arc (r′, xu1v) for some v ∈ Vj , for j = 2, 3, . . . , k. Therefore, the set
{u2, . . . , uk} has to contain a vertex from each of the sets V2, V3, . . . , Vk;
assume then, without loss of generality, that uj ∈ Vj for all j = 2, . . . , k.
Let us take ui and uj for i 6= j; we argue that uiuj ∈ E(H), which will
finish the proof. Consider players associated with vertices uij and u
j
i : they
have to share an arc outgoing from r′, so there has to exist a vertex xuiuj
and the corresponding arc (r′, xuiuj). From the construction of G we infer
that uiuj ∈ E(H).
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